The past six months have shown that India is not a swing power. We could not deter China from providing active assistance to Pakistan during a military conflict. Our weight proved insufficient to dissuade the US from singling us out with atrocious tariffs. We have been shown the limitations of India’s national power relative to the US and China. We must recognize this hard reality for what it is if we have to change course.
First, let us get the political blame game out of the way. We are where we are because the substance of our foreign policy for the past two decades has been consistent, even if the decorations were different. The trend has been towards closer partnership with the US, wariness of China and an enthusiasm for plurilateral arrangements, alongside the de-prioritization of subcontinental matters and the developing world.
This became the dominant view of India’s strategic establishment—both in New Delhi and elsewhere in the country—punctuated only by pro-Russian views that became stronger after Russia’s President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022.
Also Read: Russia-India-China: A triumvirate that’s too fragile to endure
Whatever partisans might now say, there has been a bipartisan consensus on India’s geopolitical strategy since the turn of the century.
In a world where the US is still the strongest global power and China is its challenger, it remains in India’s interests for the gap between the two to remain large for as long as possible.
The reasons for this are so deep in differences of strategic culture between India and China as to be structural. The dispute over the Himalayan frontier is a tangible manifestation, a visible symptom of the underlying cause. “One mountain cannot accommodate two tigers,” as a Chinese proverb goes, which suggests that a Sino-Indian bloc against the West can only come into being only once India stops being a ‘tiger.’ On the one hand, since we are unwilling to accept a subordinate status that China expects, the two countries cannot come together enough to challenge the West. On the other, India has an interest in creating a countervailing coalition to Chinese dominance in the region. To the extent that the US shares that interest, there is a case for an alliance with Washington.
It is therefore in India’s interests to be a swing power: allied with neither, but able to have its way with either side by leveraging its own weight.
Also Read: Devina Mehra: Why the US plays fast and loose with India but not China
India is also in a position to be a swing power. Europe and Japan cannot swing because they are in a formal military alliance with the US. Russia has decided not to, perhaps because it too has reasons of strategic culture. Brazil and South Africa, other key members of the Brics grouping, happen to be outside the focal geography of the great power contest. Saudi Arabia remains an oil exporting economy and dependent on Washington for its security. India thus is the only state that is strong enough and autonomous enough to be a global swing power.
Just because it is in our interests and we are in a position to be one doesn’t make India a swing power. To be effective India must pass two conditions: first, New Delhi must enjoy better relations with Washington and Beijing than they have with each other.
Second, it must be able to demonstrate an ability to deliver both pleasure and pain to the two countries. In other words, winning India’s support must become essential for them to achieve their policy objectives. Clearly, this is not only difficult but also a moving target. Not only must India’s political economy be supportive, but New Delhi requires the appropriate policy capacity—diplomatic, military and in terms of trade and technology—to pull this off.
We have fallen short on these fronts. A fundamental review of India’s geopolitical strategy must answer how we will fulfil the prerequisites of becoming a global swing power.
Also Read: Harsh Pant: India’s White House pushback is necessary but don’t let US ties rupture
I first made the case for swinging around 15 years ago in the wake of improved India-US relations and Beijing’s increasing assertiveness. However, after Xi Jinping came to power and decided to shape bilateral relations on China’s terms, it became difficult to sustain the swing power argument.
How could India take sides with Beijing when its People’s Liberation Army was pushing the envelope of China’s ambition at India’s expense? And how could India reject Washington’s offer of a closer defence and economic relationship that strengthened India’s ability to resist Chinese hegemony? External events made a pro-US tilt attractive. Maybe at some point, we crossed a line and became more dependent on the US than they on us. To be fair, though, it would have been considered ridiculous to hedge against the risk of the US pursuing policies that cause serious harm to its own interests.
Our response to the moment should be to wipe off the dirt and glitter from our realist lens and work out how to not just become stronger, but in the right places. It is obvious enough that New Delhi must improve ties with both Washington and Beijing.
The less obvious and more challenging task would be to figure out how to develop leverage and when to use it. And how to press on with this swing strategy even when it seems counter-intuitive, like it did in the past 10 years.
The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.
#India #isnt #global #swing #power #aim
